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THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC
SCHOOL FINANCEt
WILLIAM E. SPARKMAN *
Many forces have shaped public school finance policy in the United
States, and of these forces the law is, perhaps, the most significant.
Since the beginning of organized schooling in the United States, indi-
viduals have often challenged governments' authority regarding the
provision and financing of public schools. These legal challenges offer
an historical perspective that is often missing from public policy de-
bate. Without a doubt, the legal basis for school finance has evolved
over time and is embedded in and grows out of the historical develop-
ment of public education in the United States.
This article focuses on the evolutionary development of certain
legal principles that undergird school finance policy. It explores the
following key concepts:
I. Over time, many forces, including state constitutions,
legislative enactments and the common law, have shaped the
basic framework of school governance in the United States.
2. The courts have firmly established the states' authority
over education.
3. State legislatures have broad powers to provide for and
control education, subject only to constitutional limits and
political pressures.
4. States have a clearly established authority to tax for school
purposes.
5. Equal tax provisions contained in state constitutions ap-
ply only to the levy of taxes and not to the distribution of tax
revenues; thus, legislatures have broad discretion in the allo-
cation of state revenue to local school districts.
6. State education articles create a valid state purpose, which
justifies legislative attempts to equalize school revenues among
the school districts.
7. Local school districts are creatures of the state with lim-
ited powers authorized by statutes. These powers include all
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those expressly delegated, as well as those necessarily implied
to fulfill the statutory purpose.
1. STATES' AUTHORITY OVER EDUCATION
That the states have authority over education is a truism of con-
stitutional law. This authority is grounded in common law, made evi-
dent in state constitutions through education articles, and exercised
with few constraints by legislatures. These statements, though, belie the
historical tensions that influenced the development of free, public
schools as they are known today.
A. Common Law and Early Legal Developments
The general rule of the common law is that the parents' authority
over the child extends to the child's education. Parental authority,
however, is not unlimited and has been held to be subordinate to the
state's police power, which allows the state to impose reasonable re-
strictions on its citizenry for the general welfare of society.' This legal
principle is illustrated quite well by educational activities in the New
England colonies during the seventeenth century. The religious au-
thorities of the Massachusetts Bay Colony were not content to rely on
parental responsibility for education and enacted various laws requir-
ing parents to teach their children to read or requiring towns of certain
sizes to employ a teacher or establish grammar schools. For example,
the Massachusetts School Law of 1642, empowered town officials to
hold all parents and masters accountable for their children's ability "to
read and understand the principles of religion and the capital] lawes
of this country" by imposing "fines upon such as shall refuse to render
such accounts."2
 If fines were not a sufficient incentive for compli-
ance with the law, the selectmen with judicial consent could apprentice
out the children of those individuals they determined "not to be
able and fltt to imploy and bring up." 3
 This law did not establish
schools—it only provided a mechanism by which parents and others
could be held accountable for teaching their children to read the
Scriptures.
59 Amjuy. 2o, Pareni and Child 16 (1987). See also Campbell v. Aldrich, 79 P.2d 257, 261
(Or.), appeal dismissed, 305 U. S. 559 (1938) (public education and its control are proper subjects
for exercise of police power).
2 1 EDUCATION /N THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 393 (Sol Cohen ed., 1974).
9 Id.
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Just five years later, in 1647, colony officials enacted a law that has
come to be known as the "Old Deluder Satan Act."' This law was
significant in that it began to formalize the schooling process by re-
quiring towns of fifty householders to employ a teacher for the purpose
of instruction in reading and writing as a way of foiling "that ould
deluder, Satan."5 According to the law, the teachers' wages would be
paid by the children's parents or by the general population of the
towns. Towns with one hundred families were required to establish a
grammar school to prepare children for the university. Failure to
comply with the law resulted in a fine of five pounds being levied
against the town and payable to the next school. Although these two
laws have received the most attention by education historians, it should
be noted that various towns in Massachusetts established schools at
least two years prior to the 1647 enactment, 6
The fact that religious concerns motivated these early laws does
not minimize their importance in affirming the authority of govern-
ment to require its citizens to provide for education. Such laws began
to accustom the people to the idea that government had the right, and,
indeed, the duty to require the provision of education for children.
How the education was to be paid for was another matter that has yet
to be fully resolved, notwithstanding the estimated expenditure of
$257.5 billion for public elementary and secondary schools in 1992—
93. 7 The legal principles governing school finance were forged in the
crucible of conflict throughout the nation's history. Newton Edwards
and Herman Richey were quite accurate in their observation that even
though we tend to trace the origins of free schools to the early Massa-
chusetts laws, history shows that the underlying principles "evolved
slowly and painfully," and "the struggle for free schools was not won
overnight." 8
B. States Education Articles
The next major step in formalizing the states' authority over
education was the inclusion in state constitutions of education articles.
4 Id. at 394.
5 Id
6 Id. at 396-97. Historical sources show that the inhabitants of Dedham and Roxbury in 1645
voted to provide for a free school in their respective towns, and voted to raise £20 per year for
the school master.
7 NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC, STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF Enuc., DIGEST OF EDUCATtoN STA-
TIsTics 1993 (1993).
8
 NEWTON EDWARDS & HERMAN G. RICHEY, TILE SCHOOL. IN THE AMERICAN SOCIAL. ORDER
299, 329-32 (1963),
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An education article is that constitutional provision which contains
some statement about the state's role in public education. Interestingly
enough, only six of the original thirteen states made any general
reference to schools in their initial constitutions, although all states
ultimately added an education article at some point in their history. 9
These references tended to be vague exhortations to the legislatures
to encourage schools, or to provide for the establishment of schools at
some convenient time. For example, both North Carolina° and Penn-
sylvania," in their constitutions of 1776, required their legislatures to
establish a school "for the convenient instruction of youth, with such
salaries to the masters paid by the public, as may enable them to
instruct youth at low prices . . . ." Delaware's second constitution in
1792 required the legislature to establish schools "as soon as conven-
ient."' 2 The constitutions of Vermont" and Maine'`' commanded their
legislatures to establish schools in each town, but required the towns
to pay for them. Vermont's constitution further required that the towns
pay the salaries of the masters so that instruction would be "at low
prices. "" The initial constitutions of Alabama, 16
 Mississippi" and Oh io' 8
incorporated the language of the Northwest Ordinance to the effect
that "schools and the means of instruction shall be forever encour-
aged."°
9 CHARLES KETTLEBOROUGH, THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE FEDERAL, CONSTITUTION
AND ORGANIC LAWS OF THE TERRITORIES AND OTHER COLONIAL DEPENDENCIES OF TIME UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA (1918); WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONS (1973); FRANCIS N. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLO-
NIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now
OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Scholarly Press 1976) (1909). The
six original states making reference to education in their first constitutions were Connecticut
(1818) (Connecticut remained under its colonial charter until its Constitution of 1818), Georgia
(1777), Massachusetts (1780), North Carolina (1776), Pennsylvania (1776), and Rhode Island
(1842) (Rhode Island continued under its colonial charter until 1842).
N.C. CONST. of 1776, § XLI (quoted in BEN P POORE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTI-
TUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1414 (2d.
ed. 1878)).
II PA. CONST. of 1776, § 44 (quoted in 8 SWINDLER, supra note 9, at '284).
12 DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. VIII, § 12 (quoted in I THORPE, supra note 9, at 580).
13
 VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § XL (quoted in 9 SWINDLER, supra note 9, at 495).
14
 ME. CONST. of 1819, art_. VIII (quoted in 3 THORPE, SUpra note 9, at 1661).
15 VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § XL (quoted ill 9 SWINDLER, supra note 9, at 495).
16 AIA• CONST. of 1819, art. VI (quoted in I THORPE, supra note 9, at 110).
17 Miss. CONST. of 1817, art. VI, § 16 (quoted in 4 TitouPE, supra note 9, at 2045).
IHOHIO CONINE of 1802, art. VIII, § 3 (quoted in 5 THORPE, supra note 9, al 2910).
19 An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North-West of the
River Ohio, 1 Stat. 51, 53 (July 13, 1787) ("Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to
good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall
forever be encouraged.").
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With the exception of Indiana in 181620 and Michigan in 1835, 21
new states added to the union after 1840 adopted somewhat more
specific education articles in their constitutions reflecting an increased
state responsibility over what was becoming an essential attribute of
government. As evidenced by the more expansive education articles
found in state constitutions, political and economic rationales for the
evolving school laws superseded the religious motives that underpinned
the early colonial school laws. The later generation of education arti-
cles exhorted the state legislatures to create a system of public schools
and often qualified the phrase with terms such as "general and uni-
form," "thorough and efficient," or "complete and uniform." Even
though many education articles contained the term "free" public schools,
it would be many years before that idea was realized.
Every state constitution now contains an education article com-
manding the legislature to provide for a system of free, public schools. 22
20 1Nn. CoNsT, of 1816, art. IX, § 2 ("a general system of education, ascending in a regular
gradation from township to a State University, wherein tuition shall he gratis, and equally open
to all") (quoted in 2 THORPE, supra note 9, at 1069).
xr Miort. CONST. of 1835, art. X, § 3 ("a system of common schools") (quoted in 4 Tooar)E,
supra note 9, at 1939).
22 See ALA. CoNsT. art. XIV, § 256 ("a liberal system of public schools"); ALASKA CoNsT, art.
VII, § 1 ("a system of public schools"); ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1 ("a general and uniform public
school system"); ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § I ("a general, suitable and efficient system of free public
schools"); CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5 ("a system of common schools"); COIAJ, Comm art. IX, § 2
("a thorough and uniform system of free public schools"); CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § I ("free
public elementary and secondary schools"); DEL. CoNsT. art, X, § 1 ("a general arid efficient
system of free public schools"); FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 ("a uniform system of free public
schools"); GA. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 1 ran adequate public education"); HAW. CONST. art. X, §
("a statewide system of public schools"); IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1 ("a general, uniform anti
thorough system of public, free common schools"); ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 ("an efficient system
of high quality public educational institutions and services"); IND. CONST. art. VIII, § I ("a general
and uniform system of Common Schools"); lown CoNsT. art. IX, § 3 ("encourage, by all suitable
means, the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement"); KAN.
CoNsT. art, VI, § 1 ("establishing and maintaining public schools"); Ky. CoNst. § 183 ("an
efficient system of common schools"); La. CoNsT. art. XIII, § 1 ("a public educational system");
CoNsT. art. VIII, pt, I, § 1 ("the Legislature are authorized, and it shall he their duty to
require, the several towns to make suitable provision at their own expense, for the support and
maintenance of public schools"); Mn. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 1 ("a thorough and efficient System of
Free Public Schools"); MASS. CONST. CIL V § II ("to cherish the interests of literature and the
sciences, and all seminaries of them; especially the University at Cambridge, public schools and
grammar schools in the towns"); MICH. CoNsT. art. VIII, § '2 ("a system of free public elementary
and secondary schools"); MINN. CoNsT. art. XIII, § 1 ("a general and uniform system of public
schools"); Miss. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 201 ("maintenance and establishment of public schools");
Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a) ("establish and maintain free public schools for the gratuitous
instruction"); MONT. CoNsT. art. X, § 1(3) ("a basic system of Free quality public elementary and
secondary schools"); Nut. CoNsT. art. VII ("free instruction in the common schools"); NEV.
CoNsT. art. Xl, § '2 ("a uniform system of common schools"); N.H. CoNsT. art. LXXXIII ("cherish
the interest of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries and public schools"); NJ. CoNsT.
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The descriptive adjectives vary, but the command is clear—public
education is a legislative responsibility. What is not so clear is the
nature of that responsibility. It should be noted, however, that it was
not until 1973 that the New Jersey Supreme Court became the first
court to invalidate a state school finance system as violative of the
state's education article's "thorough and efficient" clause. 23 The cur-
rent litigation involving claims under state education articles is beyond
the scope of this article, but has been covered elsewhere.24
C. State School Laws
To focus exclusively on the constitutional education articles as the
basis for the states' legal authority over education is to miss an impor-
tant point. Regardless of whether the state constitution explicitly cre-
ates a legislative duty to establish and support schools, legislatures have
the inherent power to do so subject only to constitutional limitations.
It is a principle of constitutional law that state constitutions do not
grant power, but only limit its exercise by the legislative branch. 25 For
example, Illinois did not include an education article in its state con-
art. VIII, § 4 ("a thorough and efficient system of free public schools"), N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1
("a uniform system of free public schools"); N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 ("a system of free common
schools"): N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2 ("a general and uniform system of free public schools"); N.D.
CONST. art. VIII, § 2 ("a uniform system of free public schools"); OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("a
thorough and efficient system of common schools"); OKIA. CON5T. art. XIII, § 1 ("a system of
free public schools"); OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 ("a uniform, and general system of Common
schools"); PA. CONST. art. III , § 14 ("a thorough and efficient system of public education"); R.I.
CONST. art. XII, § 1 ("promote public schools"): S.C. CONST, art. XI, § 3 ("a system of free public
schools"): S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("a general arid uniform system of public schools"); TENN.
CONST. art. Xl, § 12 ("a system of free public schools"); T:x. CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("an efficient
system of public free schools"); UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1 ("establishment and maintenance of the
State's education system"); VT. CONST. ch . II, § 68 ("a competent number of schools ought to be
maintained in each town"); VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("a system of free public elementary and
secondary schools"); WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2 ("a general and uniform system of public
schools"); W. VA. CoNsT. art. XII, § 1 ("a thorough and efficient system of free schools");
Wis. CONST. art. X, § 3 ("the establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform
as practicable"); WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("a complete and unilOrm system of public instruc-
tion").
"Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 294 (N.J. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Robinson v. Dickey,
414 U.S. 976 (1974).
24 See generally Wit.tiAm E. SPARKMAN, School Finance Challenges in State Courts, in THE
IMPACTS OF LITIGATION AND LEGISLATION ON PUBLIC SCHOOL. FINANCE: ADEQUACY, EQUI'T'Y, AND
EXCELLENCE 193 (Julie K. Underwood & Deborah A. Verstegen eds., 1990). Julie K. Underwood
& William E. Sparkman, School Finance Litigation: A New Wave of Reform, 14 HAW. J.L. & Puri.
Pot.'v 517 (1991).
25 See Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 141, 148 (Wis. 1976). The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated
that when analyzing a state constitution "the search is not for a grant of power to the legislature,
but for a restriction thereon." Id.
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stitution until 1870,26
 but the legislature adopted the first state school
law in 1825, 27
 just seven years after statehood. Thus, if an act is not
prohibited by the state or federal constitutions, the legislature has the
plenary authority to act, subject only to direct constitutional limitations
or political pressures.
The enactment of the first school laws by the states appeared to
be a function of cultural beliefs, tradition and settlement patterns.
As noted above, the religious motives of the New England colonies
influenced the history and development of local schools in that part
of the country. However, support for the early school laws was far from
universal, and the town schools in New England gradually declined
due to a number of factors. 28
 By the time these colonies became states,
however, their citizens had become accustomed to being required to
support schools.
Over time, the town schools gave way to district schools as settle-
ment patterns began to be more dispersed over the vast territory.
Moreover, state constitutions began to include education articles which
referred to a system of public schools. 29
 To carry out their authority over
education, state legislatures authorized the creation of local school
26
 I la,. CoNsT. of 1870, art. VIII, § 1 (quoted in 2 THORPE, supra note 9, at 1035). The Illinois
Constitution of 1848 did not contain an education article, but it (lid authorize the general
assembly to exempt from taxation land it deemed necessary for school purposes. lu .. CONST, of
1848, art. IX, § 3 (quoted in 2 Tinian:, supra note 9, at 1004). The constitution also provided
that the corporate authorities of school districts could be vested with the power to assess and
collect taxes for corporate purposes. Id § 5 (quoted in 2 Tnoitee, supra note 9, at 1005),
27 An Act Providing for the Establishment of Free Schools, 1825 W. Laws.
28 ADOLPHE E. MEYER, AN EDUCATION HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN Peonac 37-41 (1957).
Meyer argued the Massachusetts School Law of 1647 was "disliked, scoffed at, and even dodged
and disobeyed" even when colony officials raised the lines to £20. In regard to the decline of the
town schools, Meyer opined that political, economic, and socio-geographical forces caused the
demise of the town school and the subsequent emergence of the moving school. A moving school
was simply the schoolmaster who, instead of teaching in town school during the year, would travel
from one community to another, teaching a time in each until he had covered the whole
township, The length of time the schoolmaster stayed in each community seemed to be directly
related to the amount of money available from the patrons or town treasury. Soon the moving
school itself was subject to local pressures as communities demanded the right to keep a school
of their own. According to Meyer, the district school was a natural outgrowth of the growing
displeasure with the moving school. Id. at 50-51.
29 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. IX, § 3 ("a system of common schools"); GA. CoNsT. of
1868, art. VI, § 1 ("a thorough system of general education"); IND. CoNsT. of 1816, art. IX, § 2
("a general system of education"); IOWA C.ONST. Of 1846, art. 9, § 3 ("a system of common
schools"); Mu. CONST. of 1864, art. VIII, § 4 ("a uniform system of free public schools"); Mum.
CONST. Of 1835, art. X, § 3 ("a system of common Schools"); MINN. CONS'''. of 1857, art. VIII, § 3
("a thorough and efficient system of public schools"); NEB. CONST. of 1867, Education, § 1 ("a
thorough and efficient system of common schools"); OR. CONST. of 1857, art. V111, § 3 ("a
uniform and regular system of common schools"); PENN. CON sT. of 1873, art. X, § 1 ("a thorough
and efficient system of public schools").
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districts as subordinate units of government for the purpose of provid-
ing schools. Questions soon arose as to the legal authority of school
districts, particularly in fiscal matters. An early Massachusetts case
demonstrates the legal principle that local school districts, as creatures
of the state, may exercise delegated as well as certain implied powers."
Massachusetts adopted a state school law in 1789, which codified colo-
nial practices by requiring the towns to provide schools. 3 ' Subsequent
laws authorized the inhabitants of local school districts to raise money
to purchase property and construct schoolhouses."
In 1813, Phinehas Wood entered into a contractual arrangement
with the residents of the Fourth School District in Rumford, Massachu-
setts to build a schoolhouse on his land and to lease the property to
the school district for $170." When he failed to complete the building,
the school district officials sued him.M At issue in this case was whether
the school district had sufficient corporate powers to maintain an
action on the building contract and property lease." The court ruled
that school districts were quasi-corporations with limited powers as
authorized by state statute. 36
 School districts, according to the court,
possessed all powers expressly delegated as well as those necessarily
implied to fulfill their legislative purpose, including those in question."
While the New England states were developing organized schools,
other states, particularly those in the South, took a more laissez faire
approach to schooling. In some states, absent strong school laws, the
predominant form of education for the children of the wealthier
people consisted of the tutor in the home, education in small private
schools or education in England." Children of the poor had to make
do with apprenticeship training or the pauper schools that public
funds meagerly supported, or with no schooling at all.
Another major transition in school policy occurred when state
legislatures began to enact more expansive school laws that went be-
yond the language contained in the education articles. This develop-
ment, which proved to be a breakthrough in the transition from
pauper to free schools, is exemplified by events in Pennsylvania during
"The Inhabitants of the Fourth Sch. Dist. in Rumford v. Wood, 13 Mass. 193,197-98 (1816).
51 1d.
 at 196.
3.2 Id. at 194-95.
"Id at 193.
34 Id
35 Inhabitants of the Fourth Sch. Dist. in Rumford, 13 Mass. at 193.
36 Id. at 199.
s7 Id
38
 ELMO() D P CUBBERLY, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE UNrrED STATES 25 (1947).
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the nineteenth century. The state's first school law in 1802 provided
for the education of pauper children pursuant to the constitution's
provision that the "poor may be taught gratis." 39 In 1848 and 1849, the
legislature took a progressive step by requiring local school districts to
adopt a system of free common schools. 4° The school directors of
Lowhill township, Lehigh County, continued to provide pauper schools,
but refused to establish a common school as required by the new
school law. 4 ' When they were removed from office for failing to comply
with the law, they challenged the legislation on the ground that the
constitution only required "the establishment of schools throughout
the state, in such manner that the poor may be taught gratis."91 For
the school directors, this meant that their only responsibility was to
ensure that the pauper children would receive some modicum of
education from public funds.
In the resulting landmark case of Commonwealth v. Hartman, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the common school law as within
the prerogative of the legislature. 43 It reasoned that the state, unlike
the federal government, retained every attribute of sovereignty that
was not taken away by the constitution." Because there was nothing in
the state constitution restricting the legislature in matters of education,
it could expand the system to include common schools. 45 Accordingly,
the legislature was not prohibited from doing more than required by
the constitution so long as it ensured that provision was made for the
education of the poor children in the townships. 46
 The case reinforced
the plenary power of the legislature over education and proved to be
a major breakthrough in the struggle for free public schools.
The first state school laws were characterized by several important
features. First, many of these laws permitted, but did not require, the
towns or school districts to tax for school support. Second, a number
of the states provided only for pauper or charity schools where public
financial support was limited to the children of the poor. Third, all of
the states created some type of state school fund supported by proceeds
from the sale or rent of public lands. 47 Fourth, state school laws tended
59 See Commonwealth v. Hartman, 17 Pa. 118, 118 (1851).
4° See id.
41 !d.
42 Id.
43 Id.
"Hartman, 17 Pa. at 119.
451d .
46
 Id, al 120.
47
 FIXTCHF.R H. SWIFT, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC PERMANENT COMMON SCHOOL FUNDS IN Tun
UNITED STATES (1911).
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to be short-lived, in that several were repealed shortly after their en-
actment or fell into disuse. Fifth, these early school laws failed to
provide a direct and stable source of school revenues. Instead, states
relied on the income from the school funds, tuition and rate bills, as
well as revenues from indirect sources such as lotteries, marriage li-
censes and bank taxes."
By the mid-point of the nineteenth century, education clearly had
become a legitimate function of government and a duty of the legisla-
ture. The legislature had plenary authority over education subject only
to limitations in the state or federal constitutions. The legislature could
enact school laws even when the state constitution was silent on the
subject. Furthermore, the legislature was not prohibited from enacting
school laws that exceeded its constitutional obligation. Courts held that
local school districts were quasi-corporations having all powers ex-
pressly delegated, as well as those necessarily implied to fulfill their
legislative function. Increasingly, government had assumed what had
been, under the common law, a parental responsibility. The basic
framework of school governance had gradually taken shape through
state constitutions, legislative enactments and court cases. But while
legislatures and the courts molded the principles of governance, the
states only reluctantly addressed the issue of financial support for
public schools.
II. AUTHORITY TO TAX FOR SCHOOLS
Without a doubt, the tax issue was central to the struggle for free
public schools. According to John Coons, William Clune and Stephen
Sugarman:
The real issue in the nineteenth century common school
movement was the finance question: in short, taxes. The great
school debate concerned whether it was moral, right, demo-
cratic, and constitutional to make schools a function of gov-
ernment, thereby forcing nonconsenting, nonusing taxpayers
to support them.49
The irony of the controversy was that there was no legal basis for
opposition to school taxes—but tell that to disgruntled taxpayers.
It is a principle of constitutional law that the power to tax is an
48 See generally CUIMERLY, Stipra note 38, at. 82-119. EDGAR W. KNIGHT, EDUCATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 249 (1951).
49 joHN E. COONS ET AL, PRIVATE WEALTH AND Puimic EDUCATION 46-47 (1970).
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essential attribute of sovereignty, one that is limited only by consti-
tutional and statutory provisions. 50 Because legislatures have an in-
herent power to levy taxes for public purposes, and because they
are not prohibited by their state constitutions from enacting school
laws, it follows that there is no legal barrier to taxation for school
support.
A. Values in Conflict
The legal logic fails to take into account the strong individualistic
tendencies in the population that caused strenuous objection to the
idea of compelling "nonconsenting, nonusing taxpayers" to support
schools. Attributing selfish motives to the opponents of school taxes is
easy, but sometimes those objections emerged from deeply held values
that were brought into conflict by the common school movement. The
struggle for free public schools in the United States reflected more
than an opposition to taxation or a skepticism of government. The
essence of the struggle was rooted in two competing values in a demo-
cratic society: individualism and altruism. 51 The common school move-
ment, which began in the 1820s, reflected a growing concern for the
economic and political importance of education in a rapidly develop-
ing nation.
Social and political changes in the first decades of the nineteenth
century, particularly the growth of cities in the northeast and western
expansion, stimulated the demand for tax-supported schools. Where
state constitutions promised free schools, advocates realized that free
schools demanded some means of support beyond tuition or rate bills.
Furthermore, a uniform system of public schools as envisioned by the
later state constitutions would not be possible without a sizable and
stable source of revenue. It became clear to the proponents of free
public schools that some form of direct taxation was necessary.
B. Early Development of School Taxes
Legislatures reluctantly authorized certain communities to organ-
ize school taxing districts with permissive authority to tax the property
of those consenting for school purposes or, later, to tax all the property
in the district. In general, the power to tax could be exercised only
after a vote of local property owners. The permissive legislation soon
511 WILLIAM 1.1. ANDERSON, TAXA'EION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 20-49 (1951).
51 FRANCIS N. THORPE, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 1776-1850,
at 448-89 (1898).
580	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:569
gave way to mandatory local taxation to supplement other sources of
school revenues." Not surprisingly, litigation soon followed.
The earliest cases tended to focus on the methods employed to
raise school taxes, particularly the rate bill, and the legality of legisla-
tive delegation of power to tax to local school districts. In 1839, in
Brown v. Hoadley, the Vermont Supreme Court addressed the question
of whether a rate bill (that is, a tax only on parents with children in
school) violated state statutes providing for free public schools." State
law provided only a paltry amount of state funds to the school districts,
but allowed local voters to decide whether all taxpayers or only those
with children in school would pay the balance of money required for
school support.54 Pursuant to that law, the voters in School District No.
15 of Windsor County, Vermont, approved a tax on those residents with
children in school to be collected by means of the rate bill." Even
though he had children in school, Billy Brown refused to pay the rate
bill presented by the tax collector, who later seized Broivn's heifer as
payment. 56 Brown sued the tax collector for trespass and was allowed
by the local court to recover damages.r On appeal to the Vermont
Supreme Court, the tax collector argued that the school district was
only following state law when it levied the rate bill." Brown, however,
contended that the tax was illegal because the rate bill method was at
variance with state law providing for free public schools." He argued
that the schools supported by rate bills were in essence private rather
than public." The Vermont Supreme Court rejected this argument
when it stated that a free school was "one to which all inhabitants of
the district are at liberty to send.' In other words, the court held that
the access was to be free rather than the cost.
In validating the use of the rate bill as an acceptable means of
funding local schools, the Brown decision delayed for a number of
years the idea of free schools supported by all taxpayers. It was not
until 1864 that Vermont eliminated the use of rate bills. 62 We will never
know whether Mr. Brown's arguments were motivated by a heightened
52 CUBBERLY, supra note 38, at 135-37.
"Brown v. Hoadley, 12 Vt. 472 (1839).
54 Id. at 477-78.
" Id at 473.
55 id.
"Id at 473-74.
58 Brown, 12 Vt. at 474-75.
59 Id at 476-77.
no Id
ird. at 478-79.
82 EDGAR W. KNIGHT, EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 265 (3d. ed. 1941).
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sense of equality or whether he simply felt aggrieved that his burden
of school taxes was not spread among his neighbors without children
in school. Clearly, though, he challenged the state to deliver on its
statutory promise of free schools.
In addition, early cases in Delaware and Maryland sustained the
right of the legislature to delegate to local school districts the authority
to tax for school support. In 1841, in Steward v. Jefferson, a Delaware
court upheld the constitutionality of a school law authorizing local
school taxes by majority vote within the school districts.° Similarly, in
1844, Maryland's highest court upheld a statute allowing school dis-
tricts to levy a school tax." Writing about the legislature's delegation
of the power to tax for schools, Judge Stephen stated:
We think there was no validity in the constitutional question
. . . relative to the competency of the legislature to delegate
the power of taxation to the taxable inhabitants for the pur-
pose of raising a fund for the diffusion of knowledge and the
support of primary schools. The object was a laudable one
and there is nothing in the Constitution prohibitory of the
delegation of the power of taxation, in the mode adopted, to
effect the attainment of it; we may say that grants of similar
powers to other bodies, for political purposes, have been
coeval with the Constitution itself, and that no serious doubts
have ever been entertained of their validity.°
C. Expansion of School ?axes
The next phase in the evolution of free public schools occurred
when a few local districts used tax revenues to provide educational
offerings in grades beyond the common school. Each step in the
process was met with legal challenges, and each court decision estab-
lished further legal precedent for a system of free public schools.
The Massachusetts case of Cushing v. Inhabitants of Newburypart
is illustrative. 0 In 1843, the town voted to establish a high school for
females and directed the selectmen to purchase a site and to have
a facility erected for the school. 67 This school was to be in addition
to the twenty-one other schools the town of 4000 inhabitants sup-
Del. (3 Harr.) 335,337 (1841).
64 Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gilt 11,19-20 (Md. 1844).
65 Id. al 19.
66 51 Mass. 508 (1845).
67 Id. at 508.
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ported. 1i8 At the time, high schools were available for the male stu-
dents,69 but the district had only provided primary and grammar schools
for females." A certain taxpayer, Mr. Cushing, paid his taxes in 1844,
but protested that the tax was illegal. 71 He filed suit and argued that
the town was without authority to levy taxes for schools beyond the
minimum required by state law." The court reviewed the history of
school support in the state, tracing it to the early settlement of the
colony, and this analysis led the court to conclude that the law requir-
ing towns to support schools was mandatory, and not restrictive."
According to the court, the statutes required the towns to provide a
certain amount of schooling, but did not limit their authority to tax
for the purpose of providing more schooling than the law specified. 74
Even though not required by statute, the high school for females was
a town school under the law and was properly supported by local
taxation .75
Similar litigation occurred nearly thirty years later in Michigan,
and proved to be a landmark case in the evolution of a free public
school system. In 1874, in Stuart v. School District No. 1 of the Village of
Kalamazoo, three disgruntled taxpayers filed suit against the school
district seeking to restrain the collection of that portion of taxes as-
sessed against them that would be used for the support of the high
school and for the superintendent's salary." The plaintiffs argued that
the local district could only support common schools and lacked author-
ity to levy taxes to support a high school." The Michigan Supreme
Court, however, rejected these arguments and upheld the school dis-
trict." Judge Cooley, writing for the majority, stated:
We content ourselves with the statement that neither in our
state policy, in our constitution, or in our laws, do we find the
primary school districts restricted in the branches of knowl-
edge which their officers may cause to be taught, or the grade
of instruction that may be given, if their voters consent in
gg Id. at 509.
69 Id.
70 Id,
71 Cushing, 51 Mass, at 509.
72 1d. at 510.
"Id. at 520.
74 m.
75 1d at 521.
76 30 Mich. 69, 70 (1874).
77 1d at 71.
78 Id. at 84-85.
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regular form to bear the expense and raise the taxes for the
purpose.''
Five years later, the Supreme Court of Illinois upheld the consti-
tutionality of a state statute that authorized elections in the townships
to determine whether local taxes would be used to establish and main-
tain a high school." The validation of the authority of the state to tax
for the support of high schools brought the struggle for free public
schools to a successful close in the United States, at least for a portion
of the population.
These cases illustrate legal principles which support legislative
authority to establish common schools as well as high schools, and to
tax the general population for their support. In addition, the courts
held that the legislatures might lawfully delegate the power to tax to
local school districts, but the power must be exercised according to
standards imposed by the delegation.
The late Judge Thomas Cooley in a classic treatise on the law of
taxation noted six fundamental principles that provide the basis for
school finance:
1. The power of taxation is an essential and inherent attrib-
ute of sovereignty, belonging as a matter of right to every
independent government. It is possessed by the government
without being expressly conferred by the people.
2. Constitutional provisions relating to the power of taxa-
tion do not operate as grants of power of taxation to the
government, but instead merely constitute limitations upon a
power which would otherwise be practically without limit.
This inherent power to tax extends to everything over which
the sovereign power extends, but not to anything beyond its
sovereign power.
3. The state government has inherent power to levy taxes;
this authority to tax necessarily falls to the legislative depart-
ment.
4. The power of the legislature in matters of taxation for
public purposes is unlimited except insofar as restricted by
the state or federal constitutions or inherent limitations on
the power to tax.
79 Id.
8° Richards v. Raymond, 92 Ill. 612, 618 (1879). See also State ex rel McCausland v. Board or
Comm'rs or Elk County, 58 P. 959, 960 (Kan. 1899) (state law requiring county to build and
support high school not unconstitutional interference with right of local selllgovertunent).
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5. Unless restrained by the constitution, the legislature has
power to delegate to school districts the power to tax for
school purposes. A school district has no inherent power to
levy taxes for school purposes, but such power is generally
conferred either by statute or the constitution.
6. Whenever the state establishes a school system to be
administered by local authorities, it reserves to itself the means
of giving the system complete effect and full efficiency in
every locality, even though a majority of the people may not
appreciate the school's advantages and refuse to support it
financially. The legislature may compel local taxation for school
purposes. 81
As the nation moved into the twentieth century, the legal ques-
tions over school taxes and school finance changed. By the end of the
nineteenth century, it was well established legal doctrine that educa-
tion was a legitimate function of government and that taxes could be
levied in its support. Furthermore, such tax support extended from
the common school, including both elementary and high schools, to
normal schools" and state universities."
What was not so well established was the procedure for allocating
the resulting revenues. Thus, the legal focus shifted from questions
about the authority of the state to tax for schools to questions about
how the state would allocate its revenues to the school districts.
III. STATE ALLOCATION OF SCHOOL REVENUES
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there
were no complex or sophisticated school finance formulas to guide the
distribution of school funds. The financing patterns that did develop
tended to involve some form of required local taxation supplemented
by a paltry amount of state funds. This practice reinforced the essential
paradox of the education policy which gained legal and popular cur-
rency throughout the nation: state responsibility, but local financial
support and control. This pattern of support, however, created ex-
treme disparities in school taxes and expenditures among the local
school districts of the states.
81 See. TitomAs M. Coot.Kv, 1 THE Law OF TAXATION 149-932 (Clark A. Nichols ed., 1924).
82
 Briggs v. Johnson County, 4 F, Cas. 120, 123 (Missouri 1877) (legislature had authority to
grant power to tax to establish normal schools).
81 Merrick v. Inhabitants of Amherst, 94 Mass. 500, 510 (1866) (legislature has power to
authorize town to raise money by selling bonds for agricultural college).
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Table I
Percent Revenue Sources for Schools, for Years 1890-1920
1890 1900 1910 1920
Income From Permanent 5A 4.2 3.2 2.7
Funds and land
County and Local Taxes
and Appropriations
67.9 68.0 72.1 78.2
State Taxes and 18,4 17.2 14.9 13.8
Appropriations
All Other Sources 8.3 10.6 9.8 5.3
Source: PAUL. R. MuRT & WALTER C. REUSSER, PURLIC SCHOOL FINANCE. 8 (1951).
In their early school laws, many states provided some financial
support for local schools from several sources, including income from
permanent school funds, state appropriations and direct state taxation.
The amount of state aid, however, was not great and constituted a
relatively small portion of total school revenues. The laws often re-
quired that local towns or school districts levy a school tax in order to
receive funds from the state." Table I shows the percentage distribu-
tion of school revenues during the closing decade of the nineteenth
century and the early decades of the twentieth century. It is clear from
these data that the local districts had the primary fiscal responsibility
for public education. In fact, the state's share declined in each dec-
ade while the local share increased, reinforcing the notion of local
control.
As previously noted, the states often authorized town or county
officials to levy taxes for school support and to determine how the tax
revenues would be allocated among the local school districts within
their jurisdiction. The most common type of state support consisted of
flat grants of equal value made to local school districts on the basis of
the number of pupils attending school, or on the basis of local wealth
measured by assessed valuation of property. Fiscal inequalities neces-
sarily resulted under such allocation schemes, because school districts
with more pupils or more assessed valuation received more state aid.
When some districts received more school revenue than others, litiga-
tion was sure to follow.
The cases that ensued between 1890 and 1964 were prosecuted by
individual taxpayers who were disgruntled over what they perceived to
be injustices in the allocation methods used by local and state officials
to distribute school funds. The plaintiffs typically resided in school
districts that received less revenue than other districts in their county,
84 CUBBERLY, supra note 38, at 188.
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or that received no state aid at all. The grievances were motivated not
by high-minded concern for equity, but by a particularized interest in
reducing local tax burdens, or in obtaining a greater share of school
revenues.
A. Bases for the Legal Claims
The aggrieved taxpayers based their claims on various equality
provisions embedded in state constitutions, particularly those provi-
sions guaranteeing equality in specific or limited instances.85 The two
most notable provisions were tax uniformity clauses, that required the
assessment and levy of taxes to be equal and uniform, and education
articles, that contained some statement about the state's role in public
education. Although the primary issue in the cases was whether legis-
lative authority in the allocation of school revenues was constrained by
the tax uniformity provisions of the state constitutions, the plaintiffs
also raised questions about the meaning of the education article and
about the application of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec-
tion Clause. These subordinate issues would come to have increased
relevancy in school finance cases beginning in the late 1960s.
B. Tax Uniformity
The framers of the state constitutions included provisions requir-
ing that the assessment and levy of taxes be equal and uniform to
prevent arbitrary taxation by state and local officials. Several state
supreme courts had to interpret such clauses to determine whether
they applied to the distribution of school funds among local school
districts. The plaintiffs in such cases wanted the courts to extend the
tax uniformity provision to require that tax revenues be equal to the
taxes paid, or that the distribution of the tax revenues among the
school districts be equal. In a broader sense, the cases challenged
legislative authority to determine how state or local school funds would
be allocated to school districts. The outcome of such cases had impor-
tant consequences for the nascent school finance systems that were
developing within various states. These school finance systems resulted
from the seminal work of individuals such as Ellwood P. Cubberly,
George D. Strayer, Sr., Robert M. Haig, Paul Mort and others who
provided the intellectual bases for modern school finance systems.
85 SPARKMAN, Stipra note 24, at 199-200; see also Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in
States Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1196-97 (1985).
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These early school finance plans were based on the equalization con-
cept; that is, officials were to allocate state funds to local school districts
in an inverse relation to local property wealth."
The courts were unanimous in their judgments that the tax uni-
formity provisions referred only to the assessment and levy of taxes,
and not to the distribution of the tax revenues. On the question of the
authority of legislatures to distribute tax revenues, the courts willingly
deferred to legislative discretion in such matters so long as such dis-
cretion was not arbitrary.
Two cases involved allocation decisions made by local officials
pursuant to state laws authorizing them to levy school taxes and to
distribute the proceeds among the local school districts. One of the
earliest lawsuits occurred in New Hampshire in 1890. 87
 In an election
at its annual meeting in March 1888, the voters in the town of Walpole
approved a motion to allocate school funds between the two local
school districts on the basis of $130 to each school and the balance on
a per pupil basis. 88
 One district had only 81 pupils with an assessed
valuation of $5,496 per pupil and the other had 274 pupils with an
assessed valuation of $3,691." The allocation scheme obviously benefit-
ted the district with more students. The district with fewer pupils, but
more local wealth sought to have the money distributed according to
assessed valuation only, a process that would be to its advantage."
Citizens of this district claimed that the constitutional provision man-
dating that taxes be proportionally assessed also required that the
revenues be distributed in relation to taxes paid,`' The court disagreed
and concluded that the proportional assessment requirement did not
apply to the allocation of tax revenues.92
 The court further emphasized
the abiding principle that the town's allocation of school money was
"a matter of local concern.""
In 1922, the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld a law authorizing
the local county commissioners to levy a school property tax county-
wide and to distribute the proceeds to the several districts within the
"James G. Ward, An Inquiry Into the Normative Foundations of American Public School
Finance, 12 J. Euuc. FIN. 463 (1987).
87 School Dist. No. I. v. Prentiss, 19 A. 1090 (N.H. 1889).
89 1d, at 1090,
89 Id.
9U Id.
91 Id
92 School Dist, No, 1, 19 A, al 1090,
99 Id.
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county according to the districts' budget estimates." The court refused
to invalidate the tax, finding that it had been levied equally and
uniformly on all property in the county for a public purpose. 95 Further-
more, the court concluded that the allocation process resulted in a fair
and equitable distribution because it was based on the estimated budg-
ets of the districts, even though they received differing amounts of the
proceeds of the countywide school tax:96 While the case involved local
inequalities, the fact that more substantial disparities existed among
all school districts in the state, resulting from heavy reliance on local
taxes, went unmentioned. That issue would remain for other courts at
other times."
The leading case affirming a state's authority to allocate school
aid is the 1912 decision, Sawyer v. Gilmore." According to a 1909 Maine
law, money from the common school fund was to be distributed on a
formula basis (one-third according to the number of pupils and two-
thirds according to assessed valuation) to all units of local governments
except the unorganized townships." A resident of one of the unorgan-
ized townships filed a lawsuit alleging that the allocation scheme vio-
lated the state's equal and uniform tax provision.m° In upholding the
distribution formula, the court ruled that the legislature had discretion
in allocating the revenues so long as it was for a public purpose, the
only restriction being that the assessment and levy of the tax must be
equal.m In rejecting the claim that the equal and uniform provision
required equality of benefits, the court stated:
In order that taxation may be equal and uniform in the
constitutional sense, it is not necessary that the benefits aris-
ing therefrom should be enjoyed by all the people in equal
degrees. . . . Laws must be general in their character, and the
benefits must affect different people differently. . . In a Re-
public like ours each must contribute for the common good,
and the benefits are received not directly in dollars and cents,
94 Reynolds v. Swope, 207 P. 581, 583 (N.M. 1922).
95 Id.
96 Id
97 See generally SPARKMAN, saps note 24, at 193.
98 83 A. 673 (Me. 1912); see also Opinions of the justices of the Supreme judicial Court, 68
Me. 582, 586 (1876) (court, in advisory opinion, affirmed legislature's authority to impose general
tax of one mill per dollar on all property in state with proceeds to be used for maintenance of
common schools).
" Sawyer, 83 A. at 674-75.
1 °4) Id at 675.
im ,ra
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but indirectly in a wider diffusion of knowledge, in better
homes, saner laws, more efficient administration of justice,
higher social order, and deeper civic righteousness.' 02
The court was sensitive to legislative discretion in the allocation
of school funds as well as the separation of powers when it noted that:
The method of distributing the proceeds of such a tax rests
in the wise discretion and sound judgment of the Legislature.
If this discretion is unwisely exercised, the remedy is with the
people, and not with the court. . . . We are not to substitute
our judgment for that of a coordinate branch of the govern-
ment working within its constitutional litnits. 103
The key principle that emerged from this case was that the equal
and uniform tax provision applied only to the apportionment and levy
of taxes, not to the distribution of tax revenues. This principle has
undergirded school finance policy to the present time, as the policy
is based on the equalization principle. Sawyer has become a land-
mark school finance case, even though the financing scheme in
question was fairly crude by present standards. The case clearly
established the primacy of legislative discretion in the allocation of
school funds, subject only to the requirement that the funds be for
a public purpose, thus giving judicial support for the equalization
methods that would follow.
In 1923, the Ohio Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality
of a state law aimed at equalizing school revenues through a minimum
foundation formula.'" The state school finance law required all the
districts in a county to levy a school tax of 2.65 mills (a mill is .1 of 1%
of the assigned tax value of property). 105
 Certain districts were entitled
to retain the full amount, while other districts only received a portion
of the tax proceeds, determined on an established formula basis.'"fiThe
court reaffirmed the principle that the constitution did not require
uniformity in the distribution of tax proceeds so long as the appropria-
tion was reasonable and made for a valid state purpose.m
102 1d. at 675-76.
103 1d. at 676.
W4 Miller v. Korns, 140 N.E. 773,778-79 (Ohio 1923).
105 1d. at 773.
106 Id. at 774.-75. In general, this formula or method of allocation was based on the number
of teachers and other employees in a school district, the number of students enrolled and the
cost of transporting students. Id. at 776.
1 °7 14 at 777.
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A similar decision was reached by the Oklahoma Supreme Court
in the case of Miller v. Childers, where the court validated a state law
providing aid for weak school districts.'" Weak school districts were
those districts that had expended the entire proceeds of the maximum
local tax levy of fifteen mills and were in need of state aid to fulfill the
state education requirements.'" The court reiterated what has come
to be known as the equalization principle by stating:
As long as the Constitution requires public funds to be raised
by tax levies equally applied to all property, the rich must
thereby aid the poor, if an efficient and uniform system of
free public schools be maintained throughout the state as by
the Constitution required.u°
In 1964, the South Dakota Supreme Court refused to apply the
tax uniformity provision to the distribution formula of the state's
school foundation program.'" The challenged law distinguished be-
tween operating and nonoperating school districts by restricting state
foundation funds only to the operating school districts." 2 The court
noted that the foundation program was not a tax statute, but only a
distribution mechanism involving funds that accrued to it under the
law." 3 Accordingly, the legislature had broad discretion to use the
money for any public purpose. 114
Six major principles emerged from the cases described above.
First, tax uniformity provisions in state constitutions do not require
that benefits received be equal to taxes paid. Second, tax uniformity
provisions apply only to the assessment and levy of taxes and not to
the distribution of tax revenues. Third, legislatures enjoy broad discre-
tion in the allocation of tax revenues. Fourth, legislative distribution
of tax revenues must be made for a public purpose, and be reasonable
and not arbitrary. Fifth, the courts will not substitute their judgement
for that of the legislature acting within any limits imposed by the
constitution. Finally, when legislative discretion is unwisely exercised,
courts will leave any remedy to the political process.
1148 238 P. 204, 207 (Okla. 1924).
11-19 hi. at 206.
nom
111 Dean v. Coddington, 131 N.W.2d 700, 703 (S.D. 1964).
112 Id at 701.
113 Id at 702.
114 M at 703.
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C. Education Article
In addition to claims based on the tax uniformity provision, plain-
tiffs often invoked their state's education article as a basis for their
assertion that the school finance laws were unconstitutional. The Saw-
yer case, discussed earlier, may well be the first time that a plaintiff
raised a state's education article in a legal challenge to a state school
finance law. The point of contention was the provision of Maine's
school finance law that permitted local governments to reduce their
$.80 per capita school tax by the amount of money they received from
the state's common school fund."`' This effectively meant that some
towns did not have to levy the per capita local tax, because it was offset
entirely by the state school fund allocation. It was alleged that this
offset provision violated the constitution's education article, which
provided that the legislature had a duty "to require the several towns
to make suitable provision, at their own expense, for the support and
maintenance of the public schools." 16 The Maine Supreme Court rea-
soned that the offset provision did not violate any limitation or prohi-
bition contained in the education article. 17
 In construing the consti-
tution, the court found that the education article was "mandatory not
prohibitory."" 8
 Although the education article mandated a legislative
duty "to require the towns to make suitable provision," the court
acknowledged that there was no judicial remedy available to compel
the legislature to act if it failed to act according to the dictates of the
constitution."' The legislature was "authorized" and had a "duty" to
require the towns to provide support for the schools, but there was no
requirement that the legislature actually do so. According to the court,
the extent of the requirement was left entirely to legislative discre-
tion. 12°
In 1923, in Miller v. Karns, the Ohio Supreme Court held that
Ohio's education article, which required a thorough and efficient
education system, created a legitimate state purpose to justify the state's
school finance law aimed at equalizing school revenues according to a
needs basis.' 2 ' The school finance law required all districts in a county
115 sawyer; 83 A. at 674-75.
I 1 "td. at 674.
117 td. at 679.
118 hi at 678.
no Id.
12° Sawyer, 83 A. at 679.
121 140 N.E. 773, 778-79 (Ohio 1923).
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to levy a specified school tax."' In addition, the law entitled certain
districts to retain the full amount of the levy, while others only received
a portion of the tax proceeds on a formula basis that took into consid-
eration the number of teachers and other employees in the school
district, student transportation expenses and the average daily student
attendance. 123 Taking this formula into consideration, the Ohio Su-
preme Court determined that it was reasonably calculated to attain
Ohio's purpose of securing a "thorough and efficient" education sys-
tem as mandated by the state's education article.'"
A similar decision was reached by the Oklahoma Supreme Court
in 1924. As discussed earlier, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Miller
v. Childers, validated a state law providing aid for weak school dis-
tricts.'" In sustaining the law against the challenge of a local taxpayer,
the court relied upon the state's education article directing the legis-
lature to "establish and maintain a system of free public schools."'"
The court noted that the term "system" indicated a degree of uniform-
ity and equality of opportunity."' Accordingly, once the local districts
exhausted the required fifteen mill tax levy, the legislature must pro-
vide some additional financial support so that the constitutional man-
date could be met.' 28 The legislature was justified in appropriating state
funds to the qualifying districts to ensure the availability of a constitu-
tionally sufficient school system throughout the state. 129
The cases described above established at least five major princi-
ples. First, state constitutions do not grant legislative authority, they
only provide limitations to its exercise. Second, a state's education
article does not create a grant of specific legislative authority requiring
that public schools be maintained and supported in any particular
manner. Third, state legislatures have broad discretion to give effect
to an education article subject only to constitutional limitations. Fourth,
a state's education article creates a valid state purpose to justify a
legislative attempt to distribute school funds on some equalized basis.
Finally, courts can interpret a state's education article to impose a
constitutional duty on the legislature to establish and maintain a system
of free public schools, and to justify a degree of uniformity in the
M at 773.
125 id at 773-74.
124 m
125 238 P. 204, 207 (Okla. 1924).
Id. at 206.
1 27 Id.
128
 Id.
P.49 m
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allocation of school revenues. While the first four principles seem to
be well settled, the final one remains controversial, as demonstrated
by the present number of school finance cases in state courts.ls°
D. Equal Protection
The final basis for claims challenging the states' allocations of
school revenues is the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
Plaintiffs in such cases claim that they have been denied the equal
protection of the law because their school districts received less reve-
nue under the school finance laws than did other districts in the state.
The courts clearly were not responsive to such claims and dispatched
them quickly.
The Maine Supreme Court in Sawyer concluded that the school
finance law in question was not discriminatory, because it treated
persons in similar circumstances alike)" It cited with approval the
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Ben Gap
RR. v. Pennsylvania,' 32
 which stated:
The provision in the fourteenth amendment that no state
shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws was not intended to prevent a state
from adjusting its system of taxation in all proper and reason-
able ways.'"
In the case of Miller v. Karns, the Supreme Court of Ohio held
that the plaintiff received equal protection when he was taxed for a
legitimate state purpose by a tax which was levied equally upon every
district in the state.' 34
 Similarly, the South Dakota Supreme Court
found that the state's foundation program, which denied state aid to
nonoperating school districts, did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause.'
IV. SUMMARY
The cases presented in this Article have been important building
blocks in the evolution of school finance policy within the several
states. They have established principles that the legislature has plenary
13" See generally Underwood & Sparkman, supra note 24.
131 Sawyer, 83 A. at 680.
132 134 U.S. 232 (1889).
133
 Sawyer, 83 A. at 680,
134 Mille?; 140 N.E. at 775.
' 35 Dean v. Coddington, 131 N.W.2d 700, 702 (S.D. 1964).
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authority over education, subject only to limitations or prohibitions
contained in the federal or state constitutions, that state legislatures
have the power to tax for school purposes, and that state legislatures
have broad discretion to distribute the tax revenues among the school
districts. Neither the equal and uniform tax provisions of state consti-
tutions nor the Equal Protection Clause constrained early attempts by
legislatures to equalize the allocation of school revenues. Finally, state
education articles created a legitimate state purpose justifying state
allocation plans, even though the extent of the state's duty in financing
the public schools remained unclear.
While these early cases supported legislative efforts to erase dis-
parities in school funding, inequalities in the distribution of school
revenues endured because of the continued heavy reliance on local
property taxes. In addition, there were few challenges to the gross
disparities in the local allocations of fiscal resources to schools for
children of color. The "separate but equal" doctrine enunciated in the
infamous Plessy v. Ferguson decision by the United States Supreme
Court in 1896' 36 and the subsequent Jim Crow laws enacted by the
southern states relegated schools for African-American children to
substantially inferior status in terms of financial and moral support.
The early school finance cases did nothing to rectify this American
tragedy.
From a school finance policy perspective, the cases reviewed in
this Article reveal a singular irony. On the one hand, they supported
legislative discretion in allocating school funds in a redistributive fash-
ion by providing greater benefits to those school districts with less
taxpaying ability when measured by the assessed valuation of real
property. This was clearly a step in the right direction given the long
history of state trepidation in school finance. On the other hand,
even though the equalization principle undergirded most state school
finance formulas by the mid-1960s, the design of the finance systems
or the political compromises that shaped them resulted in tremendous
fiscal disparities among the school districts of a state, whether meas-
ured by per pupil expenditures or by local school tax rates.
It became increasingly clear to a few scholars, lawyers, practitio-
ners and parents that even with legislative attempts to implement
equalization programs, many students and taxpayers would continue
to be disadvantaged because they resided in property-poor school
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districts. By the last few years of the turbulent 1960s, citizens made a
new judicial assault on the legality of state school finance structures in
both federal and state courts. This new phase of litigation, which is
beyond the scope of this article, represented both continuity and
change in the long tradition of legal challenges to government tax and
funding policies.
